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Abstract
How does an upstream rm determine the size of its distribution network, and what
is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions we develop and estimate two
models of outlet entry, starting from the basic trade-o¤ between market expansion and
xed costs. In the coordinated entry model the upstream rm sets a market-specic
wholesale price to implement the rst-best number of outlets. In the restricted/free
entry model the upstream rm has insu¢ cient price instruments to target local markets.
It sets a uniform wholesale price, and restricts entry in markets where market expansion
is low, while allowing free entry elsewhere. We apply the two models to magazine
distribution. The evidence is more consistent with the second model where the upstream
rm sets a uniform wholesale price and restricts the number of entry licenses. We use
the model to assess the protability of modifying the vertical restraints. A government
ban on restriced licensing would reduce prots by a limited amount, so that the business
rationale for restricted licensing should be sought elsewhere. Furthermore, introducing
market-specic wholesale prices would implement the rst-best, but the prot increase
would be small, providing a rationale for the current uniform wholesale prices.
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1 Introduction
A rm deciding on the size of its distribution network faces the following trade-o¤. On the
one hand, additional retail outlets lead to greater geographic coverage and hence market
expansion. On the other hand, they also raise the xed costs of distribution. The theory
of vertical restraints shows how a non-integrated upstream rm can resolve this trade-o¤
without a need to directly control the size of its distribution network. Vertical restraints
in the form of price instruments or payment schemesare in principle su¢ cient to achieve
the optimal number of retail outlets. In particular, for a given (optimal) retail price, it is
su¢ cient to either set a suitable linear wholesale price or a xed franchise fee. This serves to
both achieve the optimal number of retail outlets under free entry, and to transfer all prot
rents to the upstream rm.
Since economic theory suggests that payment schemes are su¢ cient to achieve the optimal
number of retail outlets, it is puzzling why in practice rms often directly control the size
of their distribution networks, through restricted licensing policies such as refusal to sell. In
this paper we consider a simple possible explanation, i.e. the fact that payment schemes
may be imperfect. In particular, demand and cost conditions may vary widely across local
markets, yet rms often follow a policy of uniform wholesale prices or xed franchise fees,
unrelated to the local circumstances. Furthermore, franchise fees are often small and may not
even be su¢ cient to cover the upstream rms own xed costs of dealing with a retail outlet.
Applying Rey and Vergés (2008) classication of vertical restraints, if payment schemes
cannot easily be implemented to control the number of retail outlets, then provisions limiting
the parties rightsmay form a second-best alternative.
To assess the role of restricted licensing in the presence of imperfect payments schemes,
we provide an empirical analysis of magazine distribution. In many countries newspapers
and magazines are distributed through a network of small, specialized retail outlets or press
shops. Publishers do not grant exclusive territories, but they restrict the number of licenses
after a screening process of new applications. This practice has received the attention of
competition policy authorities. Most notably, in 1993 the U.K. Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (MMC, now Competition Commission) undertook a detailed investigation to
assess the publishers refusal to supply practices. It concluded that a ban on restricted
licensing would not be warranted, arguing that this could lead to a surge of new outlets and
sharp increases in distribution costs.1 However, the MMCs investigation did not o¤er a
1Instead, the MMC only made a suggestion that neighbouring outlets should be allowed to shift sales
among each other.
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satisfying explanation why publishers would want to refuse to supply in the rst place, and
why they would not simply use wholesale prices to inuence the number of retail outlets
under free entry. More recently, in 2008 the U.K.s O¢ ce of Fair Trading again looked into
the licensing policies of newspaper and magazine publishers, yet the incentives for licensing
are still not well understood.
We start from a simple theoretical framework where an upstream rm cannot charge a
su¢ ciently high xed franchise fee to cover all of its xed distribution costs. The upstream
rm may in principle charge a linear per-unit wholesale fee that both achieves the optimal
number of retail outlets under free entry and extracts all prot rents, without a need for
restricted licensing. The optimal wholesale fee is such that the variable prot gains of
market expansion are just balanced against the xed costs from an additional retail outlet.
However, a per-unit wholesale fee would only work if the wholesale fee can be di¤erentiated,
i.e. tailor-made to the local market demand and cost conditions. We focus on the common
case where the upstream rm is constrained to charge a wholesale fee that is uniform across
di¤erent markets. The optimal wholesale fee then still involves the trade-o¤ between market
expansion and xed costs, but only at the aggregate level across all markets. At the level
of each individual market, the upstream rm may now have an incentive to restrict entry.
We show this is the case in those markets where the market expansion e¤ects are too small
to compensate for the xed costs associated with additional retail outlets. Put di¤erently,
if the upstream rm cannot set a market-specic wholesale price, it may want to restrict
the number of licenses in those markets where business stealing (or encroachment) is too
strong relative to its xed costs.
Based on this framework, we introduce an empirical model to explain the number of retail
outlets as observed in a cross-section of local markets. The model consists of two equations.
First, the revenue equation describes total revenues per capita in the market as a function
of the number of retail outlets, after controlling for market demographics. This equation
enables us to assess the extent to which there is market expansion versus business stealing
in response to an increase in the number of outlets. Second, the entry equation describes
the equilibrium number of retail outlets per market. We consider two possible entry models.
In both models the upstream rm maximizes its own prots subject to a non-negativity
constraint on the retail outletsprots. The models di¤er in the instruments available to the
upstream rm. Under di¤erentiated, market-specic wholesale prices, we obtain a model
of coordinated entry. In each market the number of retail outlets maximizes the sum of the
prots of the upstream rm and its downstream retail outlets, trading-o¤market expansion
against xed costs. In this model the rst-best solution (from the perspective of the rms)
is obtained. Under uniform wholesale prices, we obtain a model where markets are in one
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of two possible regimes: restricted entry or free entry. The upstream rm prefers to restrict
entry in markets where market expansion is too low and allow free entry in markets where
market expansion is su¢ ciently high. This model yields a second-best outcome because the
instruments are limited.
The entry equation serves two purposes. First, it provides a natural exclusion restriction
(market size) to estimate the causal e¤ect of the number of rms on revenues. Second, it
enables us to uncover the xed costs per outlet, as well as the share of the xed costs borne by
the upstream rm. The estimated market expansion e¤ect and xed cost information form
the basis for our policy counterfactuals where we assess the e¤ects of alternative vertical
restraints.
Our main empirical ndings can be summarized as follows. We nd that the coordinated
entry model (with market-specic wholesale prices) is rejected in favor of the restricted/free
entry model (with uniform wholesale prices). We nd evidence that additional entry causes
signicant market expansion, but also business stealing or encroachment. The outlet
elasticity in a representative market is 0.31, meaning that an increase in the number of
outlets by 10% raises total revenues by 3.1% but reduces revenues per outlet by 6.9%. More
importantly, the extent of market expansion/business stealing shows substantial variation
across markets. The outlet elasticity ranges from 0.18 in markets with a high outlet density
to 0.46 in markets with a low outlet density. This variation across markets is reected in a
refusal to supply practice by the upstream rm in almost 50% of the markets, i.e. in those
markets where market expansion is too low to justify the xed costs borne by the upstream
rm.
We subsequently use the parameter estimates of the restricted/free entry model with a
uniform wholesale price to perform policy counterfactuals. If the upstream rm would set
a market-specic wholesale price to implement the rst-best coordinated entry outcome,
this would imply a relatively important di¤erentiation in retail markups, but it would raise
prots by only 2.8%. Hence, the second-best uniform wholesale price policy performs rela-
tively well from the perspective of the upstream rm. Furthermore, a government ban on
restricted licensing would raise the number of outlets by about 11%, but would reduce the
upstream rms prots by only 3.7%. The drop in prots is so small because the upstream
rm simultaneously raises its wholesale price to prevent too much new entry. Indeed, if we
hold the wholesale price constant, a ban on restricted licensing would more than double the
number of outlets and reduce prots by 17%.
Taken together, these results explain why an upstream rm may often use uniform whole-
sale prices despite di¤ering local market conditions. Furthermore, they indicate that the
business rationale for restricted licensing is not the prevention of encroachment, since a uni-
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form wholesale price can do this job reasonably well. Hence, at least in our application,
other motivations for restricted licensing appear more relevant, such as the maintenance of
quality standards.
The theoretical framework and empirical analysis of magazine distribution in this paper
builds on and contributes to the literature on vertical restraints. The theoretical literature on
vertical restraints shows how upstream rms can control the retail price and the number of
retail outlets and extract all prots, using any pair of the following three instruments: resale
price maintenance (RPM), a linear wholesale price or a xed fee. Dixit (1983), Gallini and
Winter (1983), Perry and Gro¤ (1985) and Sha¤er (1995) show how resale price maintenance
(RPM) can be combined with either a linear wholesale price or a xed fee, or how a linear
wholesale price can be combined with a xed fee, without the need for RPM.2 None of these
papers thus explain why rms would want to restrict licensing. In our setting, rms do not
have su¢ cient control over the wholesale price and xed fee to obtain the optimal number
of retail entrants per market. Firms may then want to restrict the number of entrants in
those markets where market expansion e¤ects are too low, i.e. where business stealing or
encroachment e¤ects are too high to justify the xed costs from additional retail outlets.3
The empirical literature on vertical restraints is still small, and has not looked at the
question how vertical restraints are used to control the size of a distribution network. Instead,
most of this literature focused around the question how vertical restraints inuence retail
prices and competition; see Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for an overview of the empirical
literature on vertical restraints. A main di¢ culty in empirical work is that wholesale tari¤s
are typically di¢ cult to observe. Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Villas-Boas (2007) and
Bonnet and Dubois (2010) combined demand models with pricing models to draw inferences
about unobserved linear or non-linear wholesale tari¤s, and show how these may inuence
downstream competition. Since we instead focus on the number of retail outlets, we combine
a demand model with an entry model. Our approach therefore allows one to draw inferences
about wholesale prices from an entry model instead of a pricing model as in other recent
papers.
Our empirical model builds on the previous literature on market-level entry models.
2Gould and Preston (1965) provide an early analysis on RPM and the outlets hypothesis. In a richer
framework with endogenous retail services, Mathewson and Winter (1984) analyse how alternative vertical
restraints can be used to achieve the optimal retail price, the optimal number of outlets and the optimal
service level.
3There is also an interesting theoretical literature on how competing upstream rms choose the number
of franchises as a strategic tool. While early work suggested that rms may invest in many franchises to
strategically commit to a high output, Rysman (2001) shows that (with homogeneous goods) rms choose a
single franchise, and commit to a high output by using an appropriate two-part tari¤.
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Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) introduced a model of free entry, where rms enter if and only
if variable prots exceed xed costs. Berry and Waldfogel (1999) add a revenue equation to
the free entry model to draw inferences about xed costs. Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse
(2009) modify the free entry model to coordinated entry, where rms choose the number of
entrants to maximize industry prots. The current paper is a further extension of the entry
process, where each market is in one of two possible regimes: restricted or free entry.
Finally, our paper relates to other economic literature on the magazine market. This work
has emphasized the potential two-sidedness of the market, i.e. advertizers value readers
and readers value or dislike advertizers. Most theoretical work on two-sided markets has
assumed that readers dislike advertizing (e.g. Anderson and Coate, 2005). However, recent
empirical work indicates that readers value advertizers, and that advertizers value readers
more strongly than vice versa (Kaiser and Wright, 2006; Kaiser and Song, 2009). Since the
role of advertizing is not the main focus of our paper, we do not attempt to resolve the debate
on whether readers value or dislike advertizing, and instead follow a simplied approach. We
assume a one-sided market where advertizers value readers, but readers do not value (nor
dislike) advertizing. This leads to a simplied model where advertizing enters as a negative
marginal cost component in the upstream rms prot function.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical framework. In
Section 3 we provide the econometric model. Section 4 presents the industry background
and data for our application. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical model
We present a theoretical model explaining how the upstream rm controls the number of
its downstream retail outlets. We consider a multi-market setting where the upstream rm
may not have su¢ cient price instruments at its disposal. First, it charges a xed franchise
fee that may not be su¢ cient to cover its own xed costs of dealing with the retail outlets.
Second, it may not be able to charge market-specic wholesale prices to obtain the rst-best
outcome. It would then set a second-best uniform wholesale fee, requiring the need to restrict
entry in markets where business stealing is too strong to compensate for the xed costs. In
line with the institutional features of magazine distribution, we take as given the presence
of resale price maintenance (RPM).
After introducing the framework, we rst present the benchmark coordinated entry model
where the upstream rm can set market-specic wholesale prices to obtain the rst-best
number of retailers. We then present the alternative restricted/free model where the upstream
6
rm can only set a uniform wholesale price and restricts entry in some markets to obtain
the second-best outcome. In Section 3 we provide an overview of how the two models can
be taken to the data.
2.1 Framework
An upstream rm (publisher) sells magazines to consumers through a network of down-
stream retail outlets (press shops), spread across a set of local markets i, i = 1   M .
The upstream rm uses RPM to control a uniform retail price p. Since the price is xed, we
suppress it as an argument from the demand function. Total demand in market i is Qi(Ni),
where Ni is the number of retail outlets. Demand per retail outlet is qi(Ni)  Qi(Ni)=Ni.
So both total demand and demand per outlet depend on the number of outlets. Dene the
outlet elasticity as the elasticity of total demand with respect to Ni, i.e. "i(Ni)  @Qi(Ni)@Ni NiQi .
We make the following two main assumptions.
Assumption 1. Market expansion
Q0i(Ni) > 0 or "i(Ni) > 0
Assumption 2. Business stealing or encroachment
q0i(N)  0 or "i(Ni)  1
Hence, the outlet elasticity lies between zero and one: an additional outlet raises total
market demand, so there is market expansion, but it reduces demand per retail outlet, so
there is also business stealing. There will be mainly business stealing if the outlet elasticity
is close to zero, while there will be mainly market expansion if the outlet elasticity is close
to one. In addition, we will also assume that total demand is concave, Q00i (Ni) < 0.
The upstream rm charges a linear wholesale price wi. Our benchmark model will allow
wi to vary across markets; our alternative model will consider the case where wi is constrained
to be uniform across markets, wi = w for all i. The variable cost per unit sold is c, identical
across markets and consisting of a part borne by the upstream rm and a part borne by the
downstream retailer, c = cU + cD. The total xed distribution cost per outlet is Fi, of which
the upstream rm bears a fraction  2 (0; 1) and the downstream rm the remaining fraction
1  . This means that any possible xed fee charged by the upstream rm is insu¢ cient to
cover its own xed costs.
The upstream rms prot in market i is:
Ui (Ni; wi) =
 
wi   cU

Qi(Ni)  FiNi: (1)
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A downstream retailers prot in market i is:4
Di (Ni; wi) =
 
p  wi   cD
 Qi(Ni)
Ni
  (1  )Fi: (2)
Total prot in the market is the sum of the upstream rms and the downstream retailers
prot, and does not depend on the wholesale price:
i(Ni) = 
U
i (Ni; wi) +Ni
D
i (Ni; wi)
= (p  c)Qi(Ni)  FiNi: (3)
The upstream rm faces the following prot maximization problem
max
Ni;wi
MX
i=1
Ui (Ni; wi) subject to 
D
i (Ni; wi)  0; (4)
i.e. for each market i the upstream rm has to choose the optimal Ni and wi to maximize
total prots across markets. To solve maximization problem (4), we distinguish between two
cases: the case of a market-specic wholesale price wi, and the case of a uniform wholesale
price w.
2.2 Market-specic wholesale price: coordinated entry
Suppose the upstream rm can set a market-specic wholesale price wi. In each market i,
the upstream rm would set the highest wi such that the downstream retail outlets prot
constraint is binding, i.e. Di (Ni; wi) = 0. Using (2), this requires setting wi such that 
p  wi   cD
 Qi(Ni)
Ni
= (1  )Fi: (5)
Solving for wi and substituting this into the upstream rms prots (1) gives Ui (Ni; w

i ) =
i(Ni). Hence, the upstream rms maximization problem (4) simplies to choosing the
rst-best Ni to maximize industry prot i(Ni) in each market i, and then extracting all
rents through the wholesale price wi. Using (3), the optimal Ni should satisfy the following
rst-order condition:
(p  c)Q0i(Ni) = Fi; (6)
or in elasticity form:
(p  c)"i(Ni)Qi(Ni)
Ni
= Fi: (7)
4Note that a retailer may sell other products in addition to the upstream rms magazines, e.g. news-
papers, tobacco and lottery products. The retailers xed cost (1  )Fi can therefore be interpreted as the
retailers total xed cost of operating the outlet minus revenues from other products sold by the retailer.
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Equation (7) is the basic coordinated entry condition, which we will take to the data under
the assumption of a market-specic wholesale price wi. It describes the rst-best number of
retail outlets and reects the basic trade-o¤ between market expansion and xed costs. On
the one hand, an additional retail outlet increases access to consumers and therefore raises
demand. On the other hand, it also involves additional duplicated xed costs.
It is instructive to derive the share of the markup as captured by the downstream retailer.
Dene the upstream rms share of the markup by !i =
 
wi   cU

= (p  c), so that the
downstream rms share is 1   !i =
 
p  wi   cD

= (p  c). Dividing both sides of (5) by
(7) and substituting 1  !i, we obtain
1  !i = (1  )"i(Ni): (8)
Intuitively, the upstream rm pays a high percentage retail margin if the marginal retail
outlet creates a lot of market expansion (high "i) and if the downstream rm bears a high
fraction of the xed cost (low ).5
Equation (8) provides an alternative theory to Bresnahan and Reiss(1985) theory for
the fraction of variable prots captured by the retailer. In their model, retail prices are
endogenous and the number of downstream rms is xed. The fraction of the margin captured
by the retailer is determined by the curvature of demand in their model, instead of by the
outlet elasticity as in our model.
2.3 Uniform wholesale price: restricted/free entry
Now suppose the upstream rm can only set a uniform wholesale price w (instead of a
market-specic wholesale price wi). To solve the constrained optimization problem (4), we
rst consider the optimal choice of Ni in each market i for a given uniform w, and then
consider the optimal uniform wholesale price w.
For a given uniform w, the solution for Ni in market i is one of the following possibilities:
(i) @
U
i (Ni;w)
@Ni
= 0 and Di (Ni; w) > 0, or (ii)
@Ui (Ni;w)
@Ni
> 0 and Di (Ni; w) = 0. If a market
is in the rst regime, the downstream retailersprot constraints are nonbinding and the
upstream rm nds it optimal to restrict entry to maximize its upstream prots in the
market. The retailers who enter all earn positive rents. If a market is in the second regime,
the retailersprot constraints are binding and the upstream rm allows entry as long as
this is protable to the retail outlets. The upstream rm would prefer that more retailers
enter since its marginal prots are still positive, but this is not protable for the retailers.
5This condition relates to Gallini and Winters (1983) condition, p w c
D
p = ", where  is the price
elasticity of market demand. In their formula the upstream rm has no xed costs ( = 0) and the retail
price is at the optimal level, p cp =
1
 . See also Perry and Gro¤ (1985).
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The solution can be written more compactly as
min

@Ui (Ni; w)
@Ni
; Di (Ni; w)

= 0: (9)
If the rst part in braces is lower, the market will be characterized by restricted entry; if the
reverse is true, there will be free entry. Substituting (1), (2) and the upstream rms share
of the markup ! =
 
w   cU = (p  c), we can write (9) as
(p  c)min

!

"i(Ni);
1  !
1  

Qi(Ni)
Ni
= Fi: (10)
Equation (10) is the basic restricted/free entry condition, to be taken to the data under the
assumption of a uniform wholesale price w. Parallel to the earlier condition (7), it describes
the second-best number of retail outlets for a given uniform wholesale price w. It reects a
similar trade-o¤ between market expansion and xed costs. Because the upstream rm does
not set a market-specic wholesale price, there is no rst-best outcome and each market is
characterized by either restricted or free entry. One can easily verify from (10) that market
i is characterized by a restricted entry regime (left part in braces lower) if and only if
"i(Ni) <
1  !
!

1   : (11)
Intuitively, the upstream rm wants to restrict entry in those markets where additional
entry creates insu¢ cient market expansion or where it earns a too small wholesale margin
(!) to compensate for its share of xed costs (). In other markets the upstream rm allows
retailers to enter freely (although it would prefer even more retailers to enter).
The discussion so far considered the optimal choice of Ni for a given uniform w. One
can also derive the optimal w, for example by setting up the Lagrangian for the upstream
rms program (4). It is straightforward to see that the retailersprot constraint must be
binding in at least one market, i.e. in at least one market there is free entry and no restricted
entry. Otherwise, the upstream rm can raise the uniform w further without losing retailers
in any market, so that the upstream prots strictly increase. Furthermore, it is possible that
the retailersprot constraints are binding in all markets, so that there would be free entry
everywhere. From (11), this would happen if the upstream rms share of xed costs  is zero
or su¢ ciently small, or even if its share  is large provided that "i(Ni) shows no or limited
variation across markets.6 In contrast, if  is su¢ ciently large and "i(Ni) shows su¢ cient
variation across markets, some markets will be characterized by free entry and other markets
by restricted entry, depending on whether (11) is satised.
6If "i(Ni) does not vary across markets, the uniform wholesale fee is optimal and we are back in the
coordinated entry solution where the free entry condition holds in every market.
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3 Econometric model
3.1 Overview and identication
In our empirical application we have a cross-section of local markets, i = 1;    ;M , and
we aim to draw inferences about the extent of market expansion and xed costs. On the
demand side, we observe total revenues rather than demand, i.e.
Ri = Ri(Ni) = pQi(Ni): (12)
On the supply side, this requires modifying the basic rst-order conditions (7) and (10) for
the determination of Ni under coordinated or restricted/free entry.
Dening the overall upstream and downstream markup  = (p  c)=p, we can rewrite the
rst-order condition (7) under a coordinated entry as
"i(Ni)
Ri(Ni)
Ni
= Fi: (13)
Similarly, we can rewrite the basic rst-order condition (10) under restricted/free entry as
min

!

"i(Ni);
1  !
1  

Ri(Ni)
Ni
= Fi: (14)
We thus have a simultaneous model for total market revenues Ri, given by (12), and for the
number of retail outlets Ni, as given by either (13) or (14). This model can be estimated
based on a cross-section of local markets.
Before turning to the details of the econometric specication, it is useful to discuss
identication issues regarding  and !i (or !). First consider the coordinated entry model,
where the upstream rm sets a market-specic wholesale price wi. Given an estimate of the
outlet elasticity "i(Ni) from the revenue equation and outside information on the markup ,
the entry equation (13) enables us to uncover the xed costs Fi. Identication of the fraction
of the xed costs borne by the upstream rm  is not possible from (13). However, we can
make use of the optimal wholesale price condition condition (8) to infer  from information
on the upstream rms markup share !i. Or, equivalently, we can infer the upstream rms
markup share from information on .
Now consider the restricted/free entry model, where the upstream rm sets a uniform
wholesale price w. The identication issues can be explained with a parallel reasoning.
Suppose we have an estimate of "i(Ni) from the revenue equation and can make use of
outside information on both  and !. The entry equation (10) then enables us to uncover
both the xed costs Fi and the fraction of xed costs borne by the upstream rm . This
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seems to suggest we now need more outside information (also on !). However, as we explain
in more detail below, we can set ! in such a way that the wholesale price is optimal, i.e.
maximizes the upstream rms prots (4).
In sum, to estimate either the coordinated or the restricted/free entry model, we will
need outside information on  and make use of the optimality condition for the wholesale
price to retrieve !i or !. We now describe the econometric specication of the revenue and
entry equations. For the entry equations, we take into account that Ni can only take integer
values.
3.2 Revenue equation
Consider the following simple multiplicative specication for the total revenue function (12):
Ri(Ni) = AiN
i
i Si; (15)
where Si is population size in market i and Ai contains observed and unobserved demand de-
terminants. This specication assumes that per capita demand is independent of population.
Specify
lnAi = Xi + i1: (16)
where the vector Xi contains observed market-level characteristics and i1 is an unobserved
error term a¤ecting demand in market i.
We obtain the following per capita total revenue equation:
lnRi=Si = Xi + i lnNi + i1: (17)
The parameter i is the outlet elasticity which may vary across markets. We allow i to
depend on market demographics and lnNi. The only market demographic that turned out
to be signicant is the market surface area, so we specify
i = 
0 + 1 ln(surfacei) + lnNi. (18)
3.3 Entry inequalities
Because the number of outlets Ni can only take integer values, the rst-order conditions (13)
and (14) should be modied to inequality conditions. Dene the change in total revenues by
Ri(Ni) = Ri(Ni)  Ri(Ni   1). In the coordinated entry model (market-specic wholesale
price), the rst order condition (13]) becomes
Ri(Ni + 1) < Fi  Ri(Ni) (19)
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where we dene Ri( 1)   1, so that the condition also applies to markets where Ni =
0. Similarly, in the restricted/free entry model (uniform wholesale price), the rst-order
condition (14) becomes
min

!

Ri(Ni + 1);
1  !
1  
Ri(Ni + 1)
Ni + 1

< Fi  min

!

Ri(Ni);
1  !
1  
Ri(Ni)
Ni

:
(20)
In both models we can thus bound the xed costs based on an estimate of the revenue
equation. Specify
lnFi = Wi + i2, (21)
where Wi is a vector of market-level characteristics a¤ecting xed costs, and i2 an unob-
served error term.
To obtain the nal entry inequalities, it remains to substitute (15), (16) and (21) into
the entry inequalities (19) or (20).
3.4 Estimation
For a cross-section of local markets i, the two empirical models predict total revenues Ri for
Ni > 0, and the total number of retail outlets Ni, conditional on the population size Si and
market demographics a¤ecting demand (Xi) and xed costs (Wi).
We rst summarize the equations for the coordinated entry model. Dening
i2  i2   i1
Zi  ln+Xi + lnSi  Wi
(Ni)  ln(Nii   (Ni   1)i)e(Ni)  ln(N (i 1)i ); (22)
and using (15), (16) and (21), we can write the revenue equation (17) and the entry inequal-
ities (19) more compactly as follows:
For Ni = 0: Ri unobserved
Zi < i2
For Ni > 0: lnRi=Si = Xi + i lnNi + i1
Zi + (Ni + 1) < i2  Zi + (Ni):
(23)
The model thus essentially consists of a revenue equation, and entry inequalities as in an
ordered probit model.
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The same is true for the model where the upstream rm sets a uniform wholesale price.
In this case, we can use (15), (16) and (21) to summarize the revenue equation (17) and the
entry inequalities (20) as follows:
For Ni = 0: Ri unobserved
Zi +min

ln !

; ln 1 !
1 
	
< i2
For Ni > 0: lnRi=Si = Xi + i lnNi + i1
Zi +min

ln !

+ (Ni + 1); ln
1 !
1  + e(Ni + 1)	 < i2
 Zi +min

ln !

+ (Ni); ln
1 !
1  + e(Ni)	 : (24)
Estimating the revenue equation separately using OLS would be unwarranted because it
does not take into account that the number of retail outlets Ni is endogenous and that only
markets with Ni > 0 are selected. Intuitively, Ri and Ni tend to be correlated even in the
absence of a causal relationship, because unobserved demand shocks a¤ect both demand and
the equilibrium number of entrants, i.e. i2 also contains the demand component i1. We
therefore estimate the revenue and entry equations simultaneously.
Identication of the causal e¤ect of Ni on Ri obtains because of an exclusion restriction
in the revenue equation. Market size Si does not a¤ect per capita revenues Ri, and tends
to be strongly correlated with Ni since it enters in the entry equation. We use maximum
likelihood to estimate the model, assuming i1 and i2 have a bivariate normal distribution
with means zero, variances 21 and 
2
2 and a covariance 12. For both models the derivation
of the likelihood function is similar to Ferrari, Verboven and Degryses (2009) coordinated
entry model, and follows comparable steps as in simpler Tobit II models.
Finally, note that in contrast with typical latent variable models, the standard deviation
2 is identied here, since the parameter for market size Si is restricted to 1 in the entry
equation.
4 Industry background and data set
To estimate the model, we obtained a data set on magazine revenues and the number of
outlets from the largest Belgian magazine publisher. We will therefore focus our discussion of
the relevant industry background on Belgium, based on a recent sector report of the Belgian
Federation of Entrepreneurs (UNIZO, 2005), interviews with retail outlets, and information
provided by the magazine publisher. But we also draw on the detailed reports of the U.K.s
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC, 1993) and O¢ ce of fair Trading (OFT, 2008).
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4.1 Industry background
Upstream and downstream relationships The market for magazines and newspapers
consists of three levels: publishers, wholesale distributors and retailers. The two upstream
levels (publishers and wholesale distributors) are highly concentrated. Only four publishers
realize about 80 percent of the 180 million magazines sold per year (Editions Ciné Revue,
Magnet Magazines, Roularta Media Group and Sanoma Magazines Belgium). The publisher
for which we have data is by far the largest with a market share close to 50%. Concentration
is even higher at the wholesale distribution level. The largest player (AMP) has a market
share of about 80 percent, while the other two (Imapress and Tondeur) essentially ll in
the niche segments of the market. In our analysis we treat the publisher and the wholesale
distributor (AMP) as an integrated entity, the upstream rm.7
The dowstream level consists of the retailers and has a rather fragmented structure.
In many countries including Belgium and the U.K., publishers sell their newspapers and
magazines through a network of specialized retail outlets or press shops. In Belgium
there are no major chains, so most of the press shops are independent.8 The publishers
also make use of alternative distribution channels, such as grocery stores, supermarkets and
petrol stations, and they sell their magazines through subscriptions. In our analysis we
focus on the distribution through the press shops, and in particular how the upstream rm
can inuence their entry decisions through vertical restraints. We treat the availability of
alternative channels as exogenous, but will take into account how this may inuence the
sales and protability of the press shops.
We will discuss three main decisions: retail pricing, wholesale pricing and licensing. We
assume that the publishers make these decisions as take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the retail
outlets. This is a reasonable assumption for the small press shops on which we focus, in
contrast with the other distribution channels such as supermarkets and petrol stations, which
may have some bargaining power.
Resale price maintenance While resale price maintenance (RPM) is in general prohib-
ited, newspapers and magazines have been exempted in many countries (OECD, 1997). In
other countries publishers follow a sales or return (SOR) policy: they retain ownership until
the good is sold to consumers, and unsold items are returned to the publisher. Under such a
policy the publishers can also legally implement RPM. Belgium is one of the countries with
7The distributors do not inuence the retail pricing policies, and they tend to have a coordinating role in
the publisherslicensing decisions, since the newspapers and magazines of the large publishers are typically
available at all retail outlets.
8This is di¤erent from the U.K. where chains at the retail level are important.
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an SOR policy.9 Hence, publishers have complete control over the cover prices of magazines
and newspapers. In practice, they set a uniform retail price per magazine across the country.
Retail outlets are not allowed to sell items at a discount.
Wholesale prices and xed fees Publishers also determine the gross retail margins,
either by explicitly xing the wholesale prices paid by the retailer or by specifying minimum
discounts o¤the cover prices to be granted to the retailer. In Belgium, the retail margins may
di¤er across the distribution channels, e.g. reecting the bargaining power of supermarkets
relative to the traditional press shops. However, within the same retail channel retail margins
may be more uniform. While a uniform wholesale margin for all press shops is no contractual
obligation, interviews with press shop owners indicate they may receive the same conditions.
According to the above mentioned industry sources, gross retail margins on newspapers and
magazines are about 25%, so w=p = 75%.10
As discussed in Section 3.1, to estimate the model we need outside information on the
overall upstream and downstream markup  = (p   c)=p = (p   cU   cD)=p, where cU and
cD are the upstream and downstream variable costs. First, consider the upstream variable
costs cU=p. This evidently includes the variable production costs (mainly paper costs and
printing services), which amounts to about 45% of the sales value, according to the publisher
from which we obtained our dataset. However, the publisher also has advertizing as a source
of revenue, and this can be interpreted as a negative variable cost compensating for the
production costs.11 It turns out that advertizing is about 40% of the sales value, according
to the same Belgian publisher. Taken together, the variable production costs of 45% are
almost fully compensated by the variable advertizing benets of 40%, leaving a net variable
9Other countries with an SOR policy are the U.S. and the U.K., as documented by the MMC (1993) and
OECD (1997).
10This is comparable to other countries. According to MMC (1993), the recommended retailer discount
on daily editions in the U.K. was 28 percent prior to 1989 and 26.5 percent since then, while in other EC
countries retail margins are more often around 20 percent on average.
11Consider a simple one-sided market model where advertisers value readers but not vice versa. This is
in the spirit of the empirical results of Kaiser and Wright (2006). In particular, suppose the upstream rm
has a constant marginal production cost cU0 . Furthermore, suppose that (in addition to circulation revenues
w  Q), it earns advertizing revenues r  a, where a is the number of ads and r is the price per ad. Let
r = r(a;Q) be the inverse advertizing demand function, decreasing in the number of ads and increasing
in output or circulation Q. Assume that r(a;Q) = s(a)Q, i.e. the circulation elasticity (@r=@Q)=(r=Q)
is equal to 1. Under this assumption, advertizing revenues per unit of output are independent of output,
i.e. r  a=Q = s(a)a. So the upstream rms prots (the sum of circulation and advertizing revenues minus
production costs) becomes Ui (Ni; wi) =
 
wi   cU0 + s(a)a

Qi(Ni) + r(a;Q)a  FiNi, which is equal to (1)
with cU  cU0   s(a)a.
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cost of about 5%. For simplicity, we will set cU=p = 0 in our analysis, but results are very
similar under a variable cost of cU=p = 5%.
Now consider the downstream variable costs cU=p. According to the MMC, the down-
stream net retail margins (p w  cD)=p are about 3%. Given that w=p = 75%, this implies
that cD=p is about 22%. In our further analysis, we will set cD=p = 22:85% following the
reasoning in Section 3.1: this is the value such that the observed w=p = 75% is the optimal
uniform wholesale price, maximizing the upstream rms prots (4).
In addition to variable wholesale prices, there are also xed fees to be paid by the retailers.
Retail outlets pay a small percentage of the cover price as a carriage charge to the distributor,
and a moderate xed fee when the retailers total press turnover does not meet a certain
threshold.12 Hence, in general the xed fee paid by the retail outlets is insu¢ cient to cover
the xed costs per outlet incurred by the publisher/distributor.
Licensing The admission process for retail outlets to become newsagents is similar in
many countries. As discussed by the MMC (1993), U.K. wholesale distributors evaluate new
applications based on two broad criteria. First, there is a quality assessment of whether the
outlet run by the applicant would be suitableto become a newsagency. This is evaluated
based on physical and commercial criteria, such as space and opening times. Second, there
is an assessment of whether the new outlet would generate su¢ cient extra sales (market
expansion), or whether the area is already adequately served and would therefore merely lead
to sales losses of neighboring newsagents (business stealing or encroachment).13 According
to the MMC, this admission process resulted in a refusal rate of new applications in the U.K.
of about 60 percent.
In Belgium the admission process is based on a similar assessment. Publishers screen
new entry applications and the wholesale distributor tends to have a coordinating role, as
the newspapers and magazines of the large publishers tend to be available across all outlets.
The large magazine publisher from which we obtained our data reported around 300 new
applications per year (compared to over 6,000 existing ones), out of which 75 percent were
refused. Acquisitions of existing outlets are usually approved. In some cases the publishers
themselves make unsolicited approaches to retail outlets where they consider that the area
is not yet adequately served.
12In 2003 the percentage carriage charge amounted to 0.95 percent of the previous months press turnover
(evaluated at wholesale prices), with a minimum of e92.51 per month. The monthly at rate was e74.27,
unless yearly press turnover (evaluated at wholesale prices) exceeded e31,662.
13For an interesting and more detailed discussion of the admission process we refer to MMC (1993),
Chapter 6, in particular paragraphs 6.176.36.
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4.2 Data set and OLS regressions
The data set Our main data set consists of total magazine revenues and the total number
of retail outlets for a cross-section of local markets in Belgium in 2001, as obtained from the
largest Belgian magazine publisher. This information is broken down by type of distribution
channel: press shops, grocery stores, supermarkets and petrol stations. For each local market
we also observe revenues from subscriptions. We supplement this main data set with data
on various market-level demographic characteristics such as population size.14
The markets are dened by postal codes, which are part of administrative municipalities
and typically consist of about one or two traditional towns. To reduce potential problems
with overlapping markets, we focus on a subsample of 950 non-urban markets (dened as
markets with a population density of less than 800 per km2), having on average about 6,400
inhabitants.
To estimate our empirical model we will focus on the press shops, since the upstream
rm can inuence their entry decisions through vertical restraints.15 We treat the number
of outlets of other distribution channels as control variables. So our earlier variable Ri will
refer to total press shop revenues, and similarly Ni will refer to the total number of press
shops.
Table 1 provides precise denitions of our variables, and Table 2 presents summary sta-
tistics for the cross-section of 950 non-urban markets, and the subsample with at least one
press shop. Per capita total revenues from press shops are on average e5.19 across markets,
which is considerably higher than per capita revenues from subscriptions (e1.48). Table 2
also reveals the density of the various distribution channels. The average number of press
shops per market is 2.12, versus only 0.5 for supermarkets, 0.38 for grocery stores and 0.17
for petrol stations. Finally, Table 2 shows summary statistics of the market demograph-
ics: population (number of inhabitants per market), the market surface area (in km2), the
fraction of foreigners, the fraction of young (under the age of 18) and elderly (over the age
of 65), average income, the unemployment rate, and a dummy variable for the region of
Flanders (Dutch-speaking part of Belgium). Table 2 shows that several of the demographics
may di¤er depending on whether the full sample or the subsample of markets with at least
one press shop is considered. For example, the average population size is 6,438 across all
markets, but up to 9,005 in markets with at least one press shop.
14The demographic characteristics were obtained from the N.I.S. (National Institute of Statistics), Ecodata
(Federal Government Agency for Economics), and the R.S.Z. (the National Institute of Social Security).
15Note also that press shops constitute most of the revenues (60 percent) and of the number of outlets (62
percent).
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OLS regressions To obtain rst insights into the relationship between total revenues and
the number of outlets, we rst run a simple OLS regression for the log of per capita press
shop revenues (lnRi=Si) on the log of the number of press shops (lnNi), the number of
outlets of the other types and the market characteristics.16 This is essentially specication
(17), except that the coe¢ cient for lnNi is assumed constant across markets, i = . This
coe¢ cient is the outlet elasticity, measuring the extent of market expansion, but it should
be interpreted with caution here since we have not yet accounted for the endogeneity of Ni.
The left part of Table 3 shows the results. Consider rst the estimated market expansion
and business stealing e¤ects for press shops, the main focus of our analysis. The estimated
outlet elasticity is 0.46, showing that both market expansion and business stealing are im-
portant. For example, a increase in the number of press shops from 5 to 6 (so a 20% increase)
would lead to a market expansion of 9.2% and a business stealing of 10.8%. Furthermore,
the coe¢ cients on the other number of outlets of other distribution channels show that there
is signicant business stealing from other distribution channels. An additional supermarket
in the market reduces revenues by 11%, whereas an additional grocery store or petrol station
reduces revenues by respectively 9% and 5% (although the latter e¤ect is not statistically
signicant).
The regression also shows the role of market characteristics. Press shop revenues are
smaller in geographically large markets (with a large surface area), in markets with a high
unemployment rate or a small fraction of foreigners. Income per capita and the number of
elderly do not have a signicant e¤ect.
It is interesting to compare the press shop revenue regression with a similar regression
for subscription revenues. While this is not the focus of our paper and we will not look into
this further, it does reveal some interesting di¤erences. The right part of Table 3 shows that
subscription revenues su¤er from signicant but small business stealing from press shops:
an additional press shop in the market reduces subscription revenues by 2%. The extent of
business stealing from other distribution channels on subscription revenues is not statistically
signicant. Markets with high unemployment and a low fraction of foreigners tend to have
higher subscription revenues, similar to what we found for press shops. However, income
per capita and the number of elderly also have a positive e¤ect on subscription revenues, in
contrast to our ndings for press shops. This indicates that high income and elderly people
prefer a subscription over a visit to the press shop. Furthermore, the subscription revenues
are larger in geographically large markets, the opposite of what we found for press shops.
This indicates the importance of transportation costs: people tend to buy subscriptions in
16We use the level rather than log of the number of outlets of other types, since we do not want to exclude
markets where there are zero outlets of the other types.
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geographically large markets with a high expected distance to the retail outlet, and travel
to press shops in small markets.
5 Empirical analysis
In a rst step we estimate the parameters of the structural econometric model derived in
Sections 2 and 3. We infer the extent of market expansion and the magnitude of xed costs
per outlet (press shop). We consider both the model of coordinated entry and the model of
restricted/free entry, and we compare both models using a test for non-nested models.
In the second step we focus on the preferred restricted/free entry model with uniform
wholesale fees and perform policy counterfactuals. We ask by how much prots would drop
if the government would ban restricted licensing policies, and by how much prots would
increase if the upstream rm would set market-specic wholesale fees to implement the
rst-best coordinated outcome. As shown below, these counterfactuals contribute to under-
standing the rationale for how and why an upstream rm uses vertical restraints to determine
the size of its distribution network.
5.1 Econometric results
The coordinated entry model consists of the revenue equation (17) and the entry inequalities
(19), as summarized by (23). The restricted/free entry model consists of the same revenue
equation (17) and the entry inequalities (20), summarized by (24). To estimate both models
we use data for a cross-section of 950 local markets, as discussed in Section 4. The endogenous
variables are total revenues from press shops Ri and the number of press shops Ni. The
variable market size Si does not a¤ect per capita total revenues Ri=Si, so that it serves as an
exclusion restriction to identify the market expansion e¤ects. Finally, the model contains two
vectors of market characteristics, Xi andWi. The vectorXi enters the revenue equation (17)
and consists of two parts: variables measuring the availability of competing channels (number
of supermarkets, grocery stores and petrol stations), and a vector of market demographics
(the markets surface area, the fraction of foreigners, the fraction of young and elderly,
average income, the unemployment rate and a region dummy for Flanders). The vector
Wi a¤ects xed costs per outlet (Fi) in the entry equation and only includes the market
demographics.
Coordinated entry model The left part of Table 4 shows the maximum likelihood es-
timates for the coordinated entry model. First, consider the parameters in the revenue
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equation (i and ). Recall that the outlet elasticity i varies across markets according
to equation (18), which depends on the ln(surfacei) and lnNi.17The outlet elasticity is 0.49
in a representative market (with average market surface area and number of outlets). Fur-
thermore, the outlet elasticity shows important variation across markets, varying between
0.20 and 0.73. As expected, the outlet elasticity is signicantly higher in markets where the
surface area is large and in markets where there are currently few outlets. Intuitively, an
additional outlet especially leads to strong market expansion in markets where the outlet
density is low, as may be expected if outlets are mainly di¤erentiated in a spatial sense.
Now consider the other parameter estimates in the revenue equation (). Additional
grocery stores still imply signicant business stealing from press shops, as found in the OLS
regression. However, additional supermarkets lead to smaller business stealing than in the
OLS regression and petrol stations no longer have a signicant business stealing e¤ect. The
e¤ect of the market demographics is similar to the OLS regression. Markets with a high
surface area tend to have lower press shop revenues. Markets with a high unemployment
rate and a low fraction of foreigners imply higher revenues.
Finally, consider the xed cost parameters () in the coordinated entry model. Fixed
costs per outlet (Fi) tend to be larger in markets with a high per capita income and un-
employment rate, and a low fraction of foreigners and elderly. The xed costs per outlet
in a representative market (evaluated at sample means) are Fi = exp(Wi) =e4; 704, with
a 95 percent condence interval of [4; 413; 4; 995]. The R2 is equal to 0:51 for the revenue
equation and 0:85 for the entry equation.18
Restricted/free entry model The right part of Table 4 shows the estimates for the re-
stricted/free entry model. The estimated outlet elasticity is 0.31 in a representative market,
which is lower than in the coordinated entry model. The outlet elasticity again shows im-
portant variation across markets, from 0.18 in markets with a high outlet density to 0.46
in markets with a low outlet density (i.e. high surface area or low number of outlets). The
other parameters in the revenue equation () and the xed cost parameters () are similar to
those obtained in the coordinated entry model. The xed costs per outlet in a representative
market Fi = exp(Wi) =e2; 844, with a 95 percent condence interval of [2; 125; 3; 564]. The
model contains one additional parameter, , which is the fraction of the xed costs borne by
17We also allowed the outlet elasticity to depend on other market demographics, but these were not
signicant.
18To obtain a measure of the R2 for the entry equation, we follow an approach similar to Berry and
Waldfogel (1999) and compute the correlation between the observed number of press shops and the number
predicted from a large number of draws of i1 and i2 (1,000 draws per market). This correlation is 0:92,
implying an R2 of 0:85.
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upstream rm. We nd that  = 0:95 (with a standard error of 0:01), implying that 95% of
the xed costs are borne by the upstream rm. With an R2 of 0:50 for the revenue equation
and 0:86 for the entry equation, the t of the restricted/free entry model appears similar as
the one of the coordinated entry models.
To compare the coordinated entry model with the restricted/free entry model, we apply
the test of Vuong (1989), which is a likelihood ratio test to select among non-nested or over-
lapping models. According to the null-hypothesis H0 the two models are indistinguishable
from one another. According to the rst alternative hypothesis, HC , the coordinated entry
model is superior to the restricted/free entry model. According to the second alternative
hypothesis, HRF , the restricted/free entry model is superior. Vuongs test statistic  con-
verges in distribution to a standard normal so that  = 0 under H0,  > 0 under HC and
 < 0 under HRF . The log-likelihood is -1424.70 under the coordinated entry model and
-1407.80 under the restricted/free entry model. The resulting test statistic, adjusted for the
fact that the restricted/free parameter has one additional parameter , is 1.93 implying that
the coordinated entry model should be rejected in favor of the restricted/free entry model
at a signicance level close to 5%.
5.2 The role of vertical restraints
Based on the parameter estimates we now perform policy counterfactuals to assess the role of
vertical restraints. We focus on the model of restricted/free entry, with a uniform wholesale
price, since this was preferred over the model of coordinated entry, with a market-specic
wholesale price. We consider four scenarios. The rst scenario is the status quo, where the
upstream rm sets a uniform wholesale price and can restrict entry. In the second and third
scenario the upstream rm still sets a uniform wholesale price but is no longer allowed to
restrict entry. The second scenario keeps the uniform wholesale price constant, whereas the
third scenario allows the upstream rm to raise its uniform wholesale price to prevent to
much entry. In the fourth scenario the upstream rm sets a market-specic wholesale price,
so that it can achieve the rst-best without a need to directly restrict entry. In each of these
scenarios we compute the wholesale price (uniform or di¤erentiated), the number of retail
outlets and the upstream and downstream prots.
5.2.1 Methodology
To predict the market outcomes under the various scenarios, we proceed as follows. For
each market we take 1,000 draws for the demand and xed cost errors i1 and i2. First
consider the status quo scenario, where the upstream rm sets a uniform wholesale price and
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can restrict entry. For each market and draw we start from a given uniform wholesale price
w=p and we compute the upstream rms prot maximizing number of outlets, under the
constraint that retail prots are nonnegative. We then sum the upstream rms prots across
all markets and search for the w=p that maximizes the upstream rms total prots across
markets. We will verify whether the obtained optimal w=p is similar to the w=p assumed
to estimate the model. If so, this indicates that our assumed parameter for the retail cost
cD=p = 22:85% is consistent with an optimal uniform w=p.
Now consider the second and third scenarios, where the upstream rm still sets a uniform
wholesale price but is banned from restricting entry. We again start from a given uniform
wholesale price. For each market and draw we now do not compute the prot-maximizing,
but instead the maximum number of outlets such that retail prots are still positive (as
under free entry). In the second scenario we simply set w=p equal to the status quo level (as
found in rst scenario), whereas in the second scenario we search for the w=p that maximizes
the upstream rms total prots across markets.
Finally, consider the fourth scenario with market-specic wholesale prices. For each mar-
ket and draw we compute the joint-prot maximizing number of outlets and the maximum
wholesale price wi=p that implements this number of outlets.
For each scenario we will present the calculated wholesale prices (mean and distribution),
the total number of retail entrants, and the total prots across markets. Standard errors are
obtained from our 1,000 draws.
5.2.2 Results
Table 5 shows the results from the counterfactuals. Let us begin with the rst scenario
of the status quo (left column). The uniform wholesale price w=p = 74:99%, which is
close to the wholesale price of 75% assumed to estimate the model. This shows that our
assumed retail cost parameter cD=p = 22:85% is consistent with the optimal wholesale
price.19 The predicted total number of retail outlets across all markets is 2006, and this does
not di¤er signicantly from the actual number of outlets (2013). Total prots (upstream plus
downstream) are e18.61 million. Because uniform prices imply restricted entry in almost 50%
of the markets (471 markets), the retail outlets earn some rents, but they turn out to be
very small in the aggregate (e0.34 million or 1.8% of total prots).
Now consider the second and third scenario (two middle columns), where there is still
a uniform wholesale price but the government imposes a ban on restricted licensing. If the
19We also estimated the model under alternative assumed values for the value cD=p. Under these alterna-
tive values, the status quo prediction for the optimal uniform wholesale price was always further away from
75%.
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upstream rm keeps its wholesale price constant (second scenario), the number of retail
outlets more than doubles, from 2006 to 4310, and its prots would go down by almost
17% (from 18.27 to 15.20). However, the upstream rm can adjust its wholesale price
instrument to avoid too much entry (third scenario). This shows the upstream rm would
raise its wholesale price from 74.99% to 75.77%. Because the retail costs cD=p = 22:85%,
this implies a drop in the retailersnet margins from 2.16% to 1.38%. Accounting for this
adjusted wholesale price, the ban on restricted licensing leads to an increase in the number
of retail outlets by only 11%, from 2006 to 2225. Furthermore, the drop in the upstream
rms prots is no longer 17% but only 3.7% if the upstream rm can adjust its wholesale
price.
Finally, consider the fourth scenario (right column), where the upstream rm sets market-
specic wholesale prices to implement the rst-best and extract all rents. On average, the
wholesale price is wi=p = 75:53%, which is close to the uniform wholesale price of 74.99%.
The extent of di¤erentiation in wholesale prices appears to be limited, varying from 73.51%
(2.5% quantile) to 76.25% (97.5% quantile). But this results in a relatively large variation of
the net retail margins, from 0.90% to 3.64% (because of the retail costs of cD=p = 22:85%).
However, these market-specic wholesale margins do not contribute much to raising prots.
Under the (second-best) status quo with an optimal uniform wholesale price total prots
are e18.61 million, of which the upstream rm extracts e18.27 million. Under the rst-best
with the optimal market-specic wholesale price total prots are e18.79 million, which are
fully extracted by the upstream rm. Hence, the upstream rm would be able raise its prots
by only 2.8% if it would optimally di¤erentiate its wholesale prices across markets.
As a sensitivity check, we also performed parallel counterfactuals under the assumption
that the coordinated entry model applies (although we showed earlier that this model had
less support by the data compared with the restricted/free entry model). We consider the
same four scenarios, where evidently the fourth scenario now receives the interpretation of the
status quo. The results, shown in the next Table 6, show broadly similar results, including
the limited protability of di¤erentiated fees and of restricted licensing under uniform pricing
policies.
To summarize, the limited protability of restricted licensing indicates that the rationale
of this common practice should not be sought in preventing encroachment in the absence of
a market-specic wholesale price. It is therefore likely that restricted entry licensing serves
another goal, such as the maintenance of minimum quality standards or other e¢ ciency rea-
sons. Furthermore, the limited protability of di¤erentiated wholesale fees (despite di¤ering
local market conditions) provides a rationale why the upstream rm prefers to set a uniform
wholesale fee, as there may be considerable transaction costs in implementing wholesale fees
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at the market level.
6 Conclusions
We have asked how an upstream rm determines the size of its distribution network, and
what is the role played by vertical restraints. To address these questions we have provided an
empirical analysis of magazine distribution. We developed two entry models, starting from
the basic trade-o¤ between market expansion and xed costs from investing in additional
outlets. In the coordinated entry model the upstream rm sets a market-specic wholesale
price and can implement the rst-best outcome. In the restricted/free entry model the up-
stream rm sets a uniform wholesale price, and each market is in one of two possible regimes:
in markets with low market expansion the upstream rm imposes restricted licensing and in
markets with high market expansion the upstream rm allows free entry.
We nd that the model of restricted/free entry (with a uniform wholesale price) is pre-
ferred over the model of coordinated entry (with market-specic wholesale prices). The
outlet elasticity in a representative market is 0.31, and it shows substantial variation across
the sample of local markets, ranging from 0.18 in markets with a high outlet density to 0.46
in markets with a low outlet density. This variation across markets is reected in restricted
licensing in about 50% of the markets (the markets with the lowest market expansion).
Our policy counterfactuals show that a government ban on restricted licensing increases the
number of retail outlets, but reduces the upstream rms prots by only a modest amount.
Furthermore, if the upstream rm were to set market-specic wholesale prices to implement
the rst-best number of retail outlets in every market, this would raise prots by only a
small amount. These ndings imply that the business rationale for restricted licensing is
not the prevention of encroachment, at least in our application. The rationale for restricted
licensing should therefore be sought elsewhere, perhaps the maintenance of minimum quality
standards. Our ndings also provide a rationale for the practice of uniform wholesale prices,
since transactions costs associated with market-specic wholesale prices may be too high to
justify the benets.
In this paper, we focused on the prot e¤ects of vertical restraints aimed at inuencing
the size of distribution networks. We did not consider the consumer and total welfare e¤ects
of vertical restraints. This would be an interesting topic for future research. More generally,
we hope that future research will further explore other institutional environments where the
entry process is more complex than in traditional free entry models.
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Tables and gures
Table 1: Variable description (referring to the sample of markets)
press shops revenues (Ri) yearly revenues from magazine sales at press shops (in market i)
subscription revenues yearly per capita revenues from subscriptions
press shops (Ni) number of press shops (in market i)
supermarkets number of supermarkets (that sell the publishers magazines)
grocery stores number of grocery stores (that sell the publishers magazines)
petrol stations number of petrol stations (that sell the publishers magazines)
population size (Si) number of inhabitants (of market i)
surface surface area (in km2)
foreign fraction of foreigners in the population in local market
young fraction of population under 18
elderly fraction of population over 65
income average income (in e10,000)
unemployment rate unemployment rate
Flanders indicator variable for Dutch-speaking part of Belgium
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Table 2: Summary statistics
all markets markets with
Ni > 0
mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
press shop revenues (Ri) 5:19 2:76 5:58 2:45
subscriptions revenues 1:48 0:55 1:49 0:54
press shops (Ni) 2:12 2:73 3:19 2:80
supermarkets 0:50 0:90 0:72 1:02
grocery stores 0:38 0:77 0:47 0:87
petrol stations 0:17 0:52 0:24 0:61
population (Si) 6438 7039 9005 7360
surface 29:83 28:22 36:91 29:44
foreign 0:04 0:06 0:05 0:06
young 0:22 0:03 0:22 0:02
elderly 0:16 0:03 0:16 0:02
income 2:48 0:39 2:52 0:37
unemployment rate 0:03 0:02 0:03 0:02
Flanders 0:45 0:50 0:53 0:50
number of observations 950 631
Notes: For a description of the variables, see Table 1. Per capita
press shop and subscription revenues are population-weighted.
Income is in e10,000. Sources: publisher data, N.I.S, Ecodata
and R.S.Z.
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Table 3: OLS revenue regressions
param. st. err. param. st. err.
press shop subscriptions
revenues (Ri) revenues
press shops (Ni) 0:46 (0:03)  0:02 (0:01)
supermarkets  0:11 (0:02)  0:00 (0:02)
grocery stores  0:09 (0:02) 0:00 (0:02)
petrol stations  0:05 (0:03) 0:01 (0:03)
constant 1:96 (0:50)  1:74 (0:30)
surface  0:16 (0:03) 0:07 (0:02)
foreign  2:35 (0:34)  2:35 (0:24)
young  1:67 (1:35) 1:43 (0:73)
elderly  0:92 (1:00) 1:27 (0:62)
income  0:13 (0:16) 0:84 (0:11)
unemployment rate 5:06 (1:83) 6:62 (1:21)
Flanders 0:65 (0:06) 0:81 (0:04)
R2 0:51 0:52
number of observations 631 949
Notes: In the press shop regression, the number of press shops is
expressed in logs. surface and income are in logs.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates from simultaneous revenue and entry model
param. st. err. param. st. err. param. st. err. param. st. err.
coordinated entry restricted/free entry
revenue entry revenue entry
 (0) 0:43 (0:03) 0:23 (0:05)
1 0:06 (0:01) 0:04 (0:01)
2  0:08 (0:01)  0:04 (0:01)
supermarkets  0:04 (0:02)  0:02 (0:02)
grocery stores  0:11 (0:02)  0:11 (0:02)
petrol stations  0:01 (0:03)  0:00 (0:03)
constant 1:80 (0:53) 8:22 (0:58) 1:65 (0:55) 7:44 (0:58)
surface  0:23 (0:03)  0:03 (0:04)  0:13 (0:03) 0:08 (0:04)
foreign  2:36 (0:20)  2:09 (0:29)  2:10 (0:20)  1:80 (0:25)
young  0:89 (1:36) 1:08 (1:54)  2:35 (1:42)  0:65 (1:49)
elderly  0:20 (1:09)  3:06 (1:25)  0:39 (1:11)  3:25 (1:19)
income  0:16 (0:17) 0:32 (0:19) 0:00 (0:17) 0:51 (0:18)
unemployment rate 4:86 (1:65) 2:00 (1:76) 8:11 (1:78) 5:67 (1:71)
Flanders 0:61 (0:06) 0:71 (0:07) 0:71 (0:07) 0:82 (0:07)
 0:95 (0:01)
1 0:45 (0:01) 0:46 (0:01)
2 0:38 (0:02) 0:38 (0:01)
12  0:05 (0:01)  0:07 (0:01)
log likelihood  1424:70  1407:80
R2 0:51 0:85 0:50 0:86
Notes: surface and income are in logs. For the estimation of the restricted free entry model, we set
w=p = 0:75.
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Table 5: The role of vertical restraints: restricted/free entry
uniform w=p di¤erent. wi=p
restricted ban on restr. ban on restr.
licensing licensing on licensing
(st. quo) (constant w=p) (exible w=p) (rst-best)
w=p 74:99 74:99 75:77 75:53
(0:13) (0:13) (0:05) (0:02)
2:5% w=p 73:51
(0:08)
97:5% w=p 76:25
(0:01)P
iNi 2006 4310 2225 2097
(38:49) (375:41) (121:31) (36:23)
# markets with 471:25 0 0 0
restricted licensing (35:27)P
iNi
D
i 0:34 0:04 0:03 0:00
(0:05) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)P
i
U
i 18:27 15:20 17:59 18:79
(0:63) (0:91) (0:62) (0:64)P
ii 18:61 15:24 17:62 18:79
(0:64) (0:90) (0:62) (0:64)
Notes: Simulation results based on 1; 000 draws per market. The rst column
shows the status quo of this model, with uniform w=p and restricted licensing. The
second and third column show the e¤ect of a ban on restricted licensing, holding
w=p constant or allowing w=p to adjust optimally. The fourth column shows the
rst-best with a di¤erentiated wi=p. 2:5% w=p and 97:5% w=p indicate the 2:5
and 97:5 percentiles of w=p. We assume cU=p = 0 and cD=p = 22:85%. Prots
are expressed in millions of euros per year. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: The role of vertical restraints: coordinated entry
uniform w=p di¤erent. wi=p
restricted ban on ban on
licensing licensing on licensing (rst-best
(constant w=p) (exible w=p) and st. quo)
w=p 74:49 74:49 75:34 75:02
(0:12) (0:12) (0:05) (0:02)
2:5% w=p 73:36
(0:06)
97:5% w=p 76:00
(0:03)P
iNi 1913 3867 2065 2002
(38:98) (275:06) (113:40) (36:37)
# markets with 361:81 0 0 0
restricted licensing (27:27)P
iNi
D
i 0:36 0:04 0:03 0:00
(0:04) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)P
i
U
i 15:59 11:76 14:49 16:11
(0:60) (0:84) (0:57) (0:61)P
ii 15:95 11:81 14:52 16:11
(0:61) (0:84) (0:57) (0:61)
Notes: Simulation results based on 1; 000 draws per market. The rst column
shows the case with uniform w=p and restricted licensing. The second and third
column show the e¤ect of a ban on restricted licensing, holding w=p constant
or allowing w=p to adjust optimally. The fourth column shows the status quo
of this model, which is the rst-best with a di¤erentiated wi=p. 2:5% w=p and
97:5% w=p indicate the 2:5 and 97:5 percentiles of w=p. We assume cU=p = 0,
cD=p = 22:85% and  = 0:95. Prots are expressed in millions of euros per year.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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